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the C:auscs of, and Circumstances attending, tbe 
ExplosIOn wblch occurred at Walton Colliery, Yorkshire, on 
22nd April, 1959 
I I  th September, 1959. 
The Right Honourable Lord Mills, K.B.E .. 
Minister of Power. 
My LoRD. 
I. In accordance with your direction under Section 122 of the Mines 
and Quarries Act, 1954. I have held a Public Inquiry inlo Ihe accident 
which occurred at Walton Colliery, Yorkshire, on 22nd April, 1959, and 
now have the honour 10 submit my Report. 
2. 1 find lhat five men lost their lives in an explosion of firedamp, caused 
by an electrical arc from a damaged trailing cable and extended by coal 
dust. in the No. 5 Unit of 10 East District in .he Top Haigh Moor Seam. 
CONDUCT OF THE INQUIRY 
3. I opened the Inquiry at the Town Hall, Wakefield. on 29th June, 
1959, and sat until 3rd July, lhen again Irom 4.h to 12th August. Fifty.two 
witnesses gave evidence. The following parties were represented:-
The Ministry 0/ Power by Mr. H. J. Perrins, C.B.E .. H.M. Divisional 
Inspector of Mines and Quarries; 
The Nalional Coal Board by Mr. C. M. H. Glover. Solicitor to the North 
Eastern Divisional Coal Board; 
The National Union 0/ Mineworkers by Mr. J. R. A. Machen. 
President, Yorkshire Area � 
The Natiollal Association 0/ Colliery Overmen, Depl/ties find Shot{i.rers 
by Mr. E. Locket!. Secretary, Yorkshire Area; and 
The National Association 0/ Colliery Managers and the Brifish Associa­
tion 0/ Colliery Management by Mr. A. Maurice Smith, Solicitor. 
GENERAL PARTICULARS OF WALTO COLLIERY 
4. Walton Colliery (formerly known as Sharlston West) is a salety lamp 
mine situated near Wakefield in the West Riding of Yorkshire � its general 
ayout, so far as it is relevant to this Report. is shown on Plan No. I. The 
olliery employed 1.285 men underground and 298 on tbe surface. a daily 
utput 01 2.200 tons being obtained Irom the Top Haigh Moor. the Low 
aigh Moor, the Kent Thick and the Birkwood or Lidget! Seams. About 
alf of this output was from the Top Haigh Moor. 
5. The colliery is owned by the National Coal Board and is situated 
n the No. 7 (Wakefield) Area of the Board's North Eastern Division. It 
as managed by G. S. Senior and there were two under-managers. one of 
hom. H. H. Gregg. had responsibilities which included the \\orking in the 
fop Haigh Moor seam where the explosion occurred. The Group Manager 
as T. Dodd and the Area General Manager H. Saul. 
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THE 10 EAST DISTRICT 
6. Plan No. I shows the 1 0  East Dislricl, which lies i n  the Top Haigh 
Moor seam on the East side of the South West Haulage Road connecting 
the No. 2 shaft to Ihe Haw Park shaft. The inset to this plan shows on a 
larger scale the ventilation layout o[ SOs Unit in which the explosion 
occurred. Plan No. 2 shows 5's Unit in detail. as it appeared after the 
explosion. 
RECENT DEVELOPMENT AND WORKING OF THE DISTRICT 
7. The Haigh Moor seam at Walton Colliery appears as two leaves, each 
about 3 feet thick. of which only the upper. or Top Haigh Moor seam. is 
worked in the 1 0  East District. The two coals are separated by a band 
of hard firecJay about 7 feet thick and the Top Haigh Moor seam is over lain 
by a thick bed of strong sandstone. The depth from the surface is about 
460 yards where the accident occurred. Faults had been encountered in 
1 0  East District in L955 and further development there had taken the form 
of driving two roads 22 yards apart through the faulted area to develop a 
longwall face. 40 yards long and known as 1 0  Eas! l's. which was advanced 
to the boundary then stopped on the 23rd July. 1958. leaving solid coal 
on each side. 
8. Two face'!' were then worked north and south respectively from this 
developmenl. The first of these faces, 1 0  East 2'5, was stopped at faults 
in February. 1959, and at the time of the accident ils old loader gale was 
being continued as a stone drift. known as 2's Drift. through those faulls. 
This drift was inlended to form part of a new main return airway for 1 0  
East District. 
9. Coal to the south of the 1 0  East Trunk Conveyor Road was intended 
to be worked by a double unit longwall face about 280 yards long. ad· 
vancing to the south. In the general plan of operations a face, the second 
10 be worked from I's Development. was taken some 20 yards wide for a 
distance of about 40 yards to the south. The western side of the new de­
velopment was then 10 be worked as a face 40 yards wide and advanced for 
about 100 yards to the west to connect with a heading lnown as 5's New 
Loader Gale, which was being. simultaneously driven to the south from a 
point further outbye on 10 East Trunk Conveyor Road. The face was then 
to be continued westward so that eventually a double unit face about 280 
yards long would be advanced to the soulh. after 2's Drift had afforded 
a new return airway for the district. 
10. At the time of the explosion the 40 yards face, known as 5'5 Unit. 
had advanced about 97 yards. A small further advance. which would have 
been made in a few days but for the explosion. would have brought i t  to 
the position where il could have been stopped to await the connection 
with the New Loader Gate. At the right (or north) end of the working 
face the roor was ripped to form a road supported by Sleel arch girders 
1 2  feet wide by 8 feet high. This road. known as 5's Intake Gate. was 
intended to become the return airway for the right (or weslern) unil of the 
280 yard face when it was finally developed. It was connected to 1 0  East 
Trunk Conveyor Road by means of 5's Intake Slit, which was a passage 
some 37 feet long that had originally been made about 6 feet wide and 
abol1! the heiglH of the seam. 
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11. At the left (or south) end of the 40 yard race, a passageway of seam 
:Jeight and some 12 feet wide, as shown in the sectional view inset on Plan 
No. 2, was being lert so that it could eventually become the left side of 
the main longwall face to the south. This passageway, known as 5's 
�ibside, was formed by the coal and by a pack about 12 reet wide; at the 
)utbye end of this pack a gap some 9 yards long had been left affording 
Iccess to the waste, which had not closed but in which thin slabs of stone 
lad fallen from time to time. A bottom loading belt conveyor in this 
,assageway carried coal from 5's Face to a similar conveyor on 5's Belt 
or Return) Gate; the latter conveyor discharged on to the 10 East Trunk 
:onveyor at the same transfer point as the stone loading conveyor from 
's Drift. 
V ENT[LA TlON 
12. In the planned system of ventilation air entered 10 East District 
;om the South West Haulage Road, partly along 10 East Main Haulage 
toad and partly from a second source some 400 yards nearer to the Haw 
l
ark Shaft. These two air currents joined i.nbye the Loading Point and 
leD took !the course to and from 5's Unit shown on Plan No. I. This 
curse was on conventional lines, but because of heavy leakage losses 
eyond the Loading Point oDly a small proportioD or the 12-16,000 cubic 
�t of air per minute available there reached the face of S's Unit. A few 
ays before the accident. a direct connection had been made by means 
f a scour driven through the waste between S's Intake and S's Return but 
leets had been erected in it to prevent short circuit of the ventilation there. 
EVENTS ON THE DAY OF THE EXPLOSION 
EVENTS BEFORE THE EXPLOSION 
13. The coal on S's Unit was undercut by an electrically driven coal 
.tling machine, blasted and hand-loaded on 10 the face conveyor. Coal 
as filled on the morning and afternoon shifts; the Intake gate ripping 
as advanced on the afternoon and on the night shifts; the stone pack on 
e Ribside was advanced on the night shift with stone from Intake ripping. 
bere had been difficulty in achieving the management's objective of obtain­
g !two cuts in each 24 hours and accordingly, in order ,to maintain work 
the break of 12.30 to 1.30 p.m. betweeD the day and artemoon shirts, 
10 coal cutting machine men and an overman worked a supplementary 
from 8 a.m. to 3.30 p.m. 
14. On the afternooD shift of 21st April, 1 959, the day berore the 
coal which had been prepared was filled and 5's Intake Gate 
was advanced. On the night shift some colliers were employed 
out the right hand corner of the face and the rippers for the 
la;;';,
ti
�G:�ate. having no work to do there, spent their shift at the new 
!I 
. 
where a number of shots, said to be about 12, were fired in the 
lne, thus enlarging the boliDg. 
15. On the day of the explosion, the morning shift filled loose coal left 
the afternoon shift and from shots fired in each corner of the face. 
!tee men spent the whole of Itheir shift transporting ,glone in a small tub 




roadside pack. At about 10.0 a.m. the coal cutting machine operators of 
the supplementary shift (W. Hudson and W. Wardle) arrived and began to 
turn the machine round at the Ie[t corner of the face. During this 
operation the machine struck and displaced the tension end of the Ribside 
conveyor. so that it had to be stopped. The driving head of the face 
conveyor was advanced into its new track and the tension end of the 
Rlbslde conveyor moved, but the coal cutting machine could still not 
be worked because its jib had then become fast in the undercut. A sbot 
fired over the jib (between 1 1 .0 and 1 1 .30 a.m.) released it and the machine 
was turned. jibbcd in and made to cut [or about 1 0  feet to a stump of coal 
which required to be filled off. The tension end of the Ribside conveyor 
was placed in ils proper position, both conveyors were re-started and the 
coal cuttmg machine trailing cable was disconnected and re-threaded into 
the new cutter ·track. No electrical trouble was experienced with the face 
equipment during the day shift. 
1 6 .  By 1 2.30 p.m. the day shift had left the face, except for two conveyor 
attendants, J. Rothery and C. E. Ray. who remained to assist the men OD 
the supplementary shift. On his way out, the day shift deputy, F. Canharn, 
saw J. Williams, a drifter employed in 2's Drift. eating Ihis snap at 2's 
Transfer Point. He asked Williams to keep an eye on the two conveyors 
until the afternoon shift arrived. 
17.  Thus, at about 12.30 p.m. five men were actually in 5's Unit, 
namely, L. E. Coe (the overmaD), W. H udson, W. Wardle, J. Rothery and 
C. E. Ray; J. Williams was just outside it. There were no eye witnesses 
10 say what happened during the next half hour. Of the six men, the first 
five were killed in the explosion. The sixth man, Williams, escaped with 
minor injuries. but he remembered little. 
TUE EXPLOSION 
18. At about 1 .0 p.m. �he Ji[jhts went out <It \0 East Loading Point, the 
conveyor stopped and the three men working there felt a rush of air and 
dust from inbye. One of them, T. Furlong, telephoned to the lOp of 
to East Main Haulage Road asking for the deputies to be sent back; he 
also telephoned to the overman. H .  Cunningham. saying that he thought 
there had been an explosion. Furlong then opened the switch controlling 
the supply of power inbye of the Loading Point and. with his two work­
mates. went inbye but returned after making an unsuccessful attempt to 
enter 5's Unit. 
19. Canharn and another day shift deputy, H. Towler, who 'had reached 
the top of 10 East Main Haulage Road when Furlong telephoned. went 
back into the district. On their way they met Williams making his way 
out; he could only tell them that he had been howled over and thought 
there had been an explosion. Towler isolated the gate-end switches near 
2's Transfer Point and then, with Canham. tried to enter 5's Unit by the 
Intake Slit. They found themselves unable to go beyond the end of that 
Slit because of fouled air. Two afternoon shift deputies, 1. Wilsher and 
1. Bedford, also attempted to go up the Intake Gate, but Wilsher's lamp 
went out after he had travelled about 1 5  yards. 
20. The under-manager, H .  H. Gregg. had been with Cunningham when 
Furlong telephoned and these two went inbye. Gregg having first informed 
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the surface electricians (at approximately 1 . 1 0  p.m.) that there had been 
a power failure i n  10 East district. On reaching the tOP of 1 0  East Main 
Haulage Road, Gregg learned that Williams had been injured and concluded 
that there had been an explosion in 2's Drilt, where Williams normally 
worked. He accordingly telephoned to the manager <at about 1 .25 p.m.) 
and asked for ambulances and stretcher parties to be made available. When 
,he reached 5's Intake Slit, Gregg saw that the belt had been blown off 
the Trunk Conveyor for a distance of some 50 yards and that there was 
every sign of an explosion having occurred in 5's Unit. He then arranged 
for a message to this effect to be sent 10 the surface, and at this stage 
Wakefield Central Rescue Station was called on for assistance. The Rescue 
Station received the call at about 2.0 p.m. and a (earn left at once for the 
colliery. 
RESCUE AND RECOVERY \VORK 
2 1 .  Gregg with others then entered 5's Return Gate and travelled along 
it to the ripping lip without difficulty. When, however. he attempted to go 
under the lip his name safety lamp went out and he had to withdraw. 
Gregg put in ,hand the restoration of the brattice sheets in 1 0  East Trunk 
Conveyor Road and in the new connection and then with others made a 
further attempt to enter S's Unit via the Intake gate. This attempt failed 
because of fouled air. 
22. By 2.50 p.m. a fresh air base had been established at the entrance 
to S's Intake Slit and from here rescue men. using self-contained breathing 
apparatus, explored the Unit via S's Intake and quickly found the bodies 
o f  four men. On attempting to travel down the Ribside, however, they 
encountered a fall and accordingly returned to the fresh air base. They 
then inspected 5's Return Gate and located the fifth body. All the bodies 
were recovered: the places at which they had been found are shown on 
Plan No. 2. 
23. Tbe clothing 00 each body was searched for prohibited articles by 
!l police officer, first on arrival at the surface and later at Wakefield City 
Mortuary. No contraband was found. 
24. At about 7.50 p.m. a series of .. bumps" was heard which suggested 
that further explosions might be occurring in S's Unit. This news was 
:elephoned to the surface and after a conference there it was decided 10 
Nithdraw the fresh air base to near 1 0  East Loading Point. This was a 
;orrect decision. since no-one remained in S's Unit and there would have 
leen n o  justification whatever for risking further loss of life. At about 
10.50 p.m. a decision was taken to seal off S's Unit to limit the spread 
If any further explosion. The construction of stoppings was begun and 
bile this work was going on the air returning from the district was sampled 
Dd measured at hourly intervals. Since these samples contained steadily 
lecreasing quantities of explosion products. the seals were not completed. 
25. On the afternoon of 24th April Ihere seemed to be no risk of any 
Flher explosion and a preliminary inspection was made by two of H.M. 
nspectors , W. M. Cumpsty and T. W. English. who, accompanied by the 
nanager and A. Wright, the Divisional Mining Operations Engineer of the 
lational Coal Board. entered the affected area via the intake stopping. 
!heir inspection showed that there was no risk of a further explosion. 
S 
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The stoppings were removed. the ventilation restored and the Unit left 
Over the week-end for any remaining explosion products to clear. 
26. During these operations a partly smoked cigarette was found in 
the cage of a canary which was being carried by a rescue team. I have n o  
doubt that this cigarette had been accidentally introduced on tbe surface 
wbere the birds were kept in a room to which many people had access: 
it is understandable that the surface searchers did not see it. 
27. H.M. l nspectors. assisted by officers of the Safety in Mines Research 
Establishment. began a thorough investigation of the affected area on 27th 
April; the work was done in the presence of representatives of the National 
Coal Board and other interested parties. The results of these investigations� 
and the conclusions which I draw from them, are described below. 
THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE EXPLOSION 
SIGNS OF VIOLENCE 
28. There were no indications of great violence 10 5's Unit. Charles 
Ray, whose body was found at 5's Return Gate ripping Hp and was the 
one fanhest from 5's face. was the only one who suffered violent lDJuries. 
The other four men died from carbon monoxide poisoning; asphyxia due 
to the inhalation of coal dust accelerated the deaths of Wilfred Wardle 
nnd Lawrence Coe. All the dead men sustained burns, but in no case 
would these alone have been fatal. 
29. Physical damage was confined mainly to the displacement of roof 
supports and to the disturbance of conveyor belts. The supports in 5�s 
Intake were undisturbed (except for two props which appeared t o  have 
been blown out from under the ripping lip) and a flame safety lamp, later 
identified as that issued to Coe. was found hanging undamaged some 5 
yards from the ripping lip. Face supports (consisting of wooden props 
and bars) had been displaced between the Intake road bead and a poiot 
about 10 yards from lhe Ribside. but apart from some chocks which had 
partially collapsed the waste edge supports were still standing. 00 the 
1 0  yards of the face nearest the Ribside. and for 25 yards along it, supports 
had not been disturbed and there was little sign of violence. Farther 
outbye on the Ribside. supports had been dislodged and about 55 yards 
from the face there had been a heavy fall of roof which extended Cor a 
distance of 37 yards; it was estimated that the roof had CaIJen to a height 
of about 3t feet above the seam. The bottom layer of this fall was a 
panel of sandstone some 9 to 12 inches thick. The ends of this panel 
were covered with explosion dust and it was clear that it had fallen before 
that dust had settled. Outbye of this fall most of the Ribside supports 
had been dislodged and the conveyor head had been disturbed. 10 5�s 
Return the top belt of the conveyor had been broken and tbe brattice 
sheets in the new connection between 5's Return and 5's Intake. had been 
blown down. 
30. Out bye the Intake Slit there were few signs of violence. The brattice 
sheets in 10 East Trunk Conveyor Road had been affected and the top 
belt of the conveyor had been displaced towards the side of tbe road 
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36. The trailing cable was that wruch supplied the coal cutting machine. 
Wh�n the outer sheath of that cable was examined closely it was seen to 
contain a superficial cut at about 1 1  feCI, and a deep cut about an inch long 
at about 2 1  feet. from the machine end. The damaged cable was carefully 
dissected. Bcneath the cuI. and between the outer sheath and rhe screened 
conductors. there was a paLCh of white powder. This was later shown to 
be similar in composition to the rock of the roof. There had been severe 
arcing between a power conductor and its earthed screen: the wires of both 
showed signs of fusion and there were indications of heating on the inside 
of the cut III the she-clth. Plates l-]V show the cable before. and at various 
stages during. dissection. 
37. J conclude that the arcing occurred at the time of the explosion for 
there was no electrical defeot except the damaged cable LO account for the 
tripping of the earth leakage protective devices whioh had ooourred simul­
taneously with the explosion. Such an arc cOll d undoubtedly have ignited 
firedamp. There 1\II3S evidence that at uhe time of the explosion the cable 
was partly coiled up near the coal cutting machine. so that the damaged 
part WclS well within the area in which I conclude that the explosion had 
begun. The control wheel of the coal cutting machine had been found in 
the 
.
. check" position. that is to say. rotated sufficiently back from the 
.. on " position ItO open the remote control contacts at the gate-end switch and 
make dead the power conducloJlS of the trailing cable. This fact does not 
rule out the damaged cable as an igniting agent; had an arc occurred, the 
maohine operator could easily and instinctively have moved the oontrol wheel 
the small amount required to reach the •. check" position. 
38. I conclude that arcing from the damaged cable was the igniting 
agent. 
THE CAUSl OF THE DAMAGE TO nlE CABLE 
39. 11 was suggested at the Inquiry that the cable might have been 
damaged: 
(i) by an accidental blow from a hand pick: 
(ii) by a broken wire in the coal cutter haulage rope; or 
(iii) by a stone. possibly one projected by shotfiring. 
The first two of these hypotheses are. in my view, improbable. Though 
the coal cutler haulage rope contained broken wires, rhere were no signs 
of fusion on the protruding ends. Moreover, a micro-chemical analysis 
of material from the fused conductor, together with a metaJlurgical 
examination of the picks in use on 5's Unit, showed that there were no 
unusual traces either of iron in the fused copper conductor or of copper 
on the steel pick points. These circumstances are not conclusive since the 
initial damage was not necessarily caused while the -cable was alive. A 
stronger objection is that neirher hypothesis accounts for the presence of a 
quantity of rock dust inside the cable. 
40. On the whole. 1 think that the last hypothesis was the most probable 
onc. though it .is impossible to say how or when the damage occurred. 
Intervals of a few lhours to a day before the explosion were suggested, but 
the period may conceivably have been longer. A contact made betweeo 
the conductor and its screen while the cable was" dead" could have been 
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broken by the resilience of the insulating material. The breakdown at 
the point of damaged insulation could occur much later. It is not surprisng 
that the defect had escaped the notice of the maohine men. 
THE NATURE OF THE FUEL 
4 1. In a colliery explosion there is [requently the possibility that both 
firedamp and coal dust were involved. In such circumstances it is necessar) 
to consider the possible pre.explosion disposition of gas and dust before 
making any attempt to estimate how far each fuel did in fact participate 
in the explosion. 
42. The amount of coked dust deposited on vertical surfaces along 5's 
Face and the fact that specimens of explosion dust contained abollt 14 per 
cent. of incombustible matter suggested that there was enough inflammable 
dust present for the explosion on the face itself to have been one of coal 
dust alone. The igniting agent was, however. an electric arc. ]t has been 
shown experimentally that such an arc can ignite a pre-formed cloud of 
'Coal dust o f  suitable composition. but there was no evidence at all to 
suggest that such a cloud could possibly have existed before the explosion. 
Moreover, experience has shown that explosions are not readily set up 
and propagated with increasing violence through coal dust alone OD working 
faces, one reason being that the force of an explosion is largely dissipated 
in an open waste. I n  this case. the flame seems to have increased in 
violence as it travelled along 5's Face and 1 conclude that the explosion 
was propaga1ed along this face mainly by gas. 
43. As gas was undoubtedly present at the site of the electric arc on 
the working face, it  may be inferred that it was also present on the Return 
side of that site and possibly for some distance down the Ribside. There 
could conceivably have been sufficient to propagate an explosion throughout 
the Ribside and, indeed, along 5's Return, but I consider 1his unlikely . 
.In my opinion. coal dust raised in the Ribside played a part i n  the 
explosion in the lower end of that passage and also along 5's Return. 
Il seems significant that the percentage of incombustible dust found in 
post-explosion specimens increased from as little as 1 8  per cent. at the 
inbye end to 78 per cent. at the outbye end. 
44. J do not think it likely that flame could have been propagated so 
far down S's I n take simply by fuel blown from the face by the force of 
the explosion. I consider it probable that in addition to such fuel there 
was coal dust at the road head and firedamp in the vicinity of the fault. 
particularly at the ripping. Here again. the incombustible content of post· 
explosion specimens increased from 1 3  per cent. at the face to 76 per cent. 
where the name died out. 
45. I am of ,the opinion that the explosion was much stronger on the 
Return than on the Intake side and that blast from 5's Return had gone 
part way up 5's Intake and some through the I ntake Slit. This conclusion 
is supported by the confused indications of direction of blast around the 
inbye end of tbe Intake Slit and the dislodgment of tbe trunk conveyor 
belt towards tbe side remote from the Slit. 
46. My conclusion js that this explosion was one based on the joint 
contribution of gas and coal dust. It began when an electric arc from a 
damaged trailing cable ignited firedamp near the left corner of 5's Face. 
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The resulting flame raised dust into the air as it travelJed along the 
working face and down the Ribside. Flame and coal dust were projected 
from the face into S's Inlake, probably finding additional fuel at the road· 
head. At bhe same time. the explosi ve force travelling down the Ribside 
raised and ignited coal dust there and continued the explosion into the 
Return Ga te. 
A�mUNT OF GAS 
47. Jt is useful, in considering the source from which the gas involved 
in ulis explosion might have come. to attempt to estimate tbe amount 
involved . Nothing like a precise estimate is possible, of course, but the 
upper limit would be the quantity required had sufficient gas been present 
10 account entirely for the observed spread of the flame. This was a mild 
explosion and L accept the view put fonvard that its effects cou1d have 
been produced by a weak mixture. The total volume of flame whieh 
traversed the face and roads involved was calculated to be about SO,OOO 
cubic feet, which could have resulted from the ignition of some 17,000 cu bic 
feel of a 7 per cent. mixture of gas and air; this would in turn have 
represented 1,200 cubic feet of methane. As tbe most likely explanation 
of the development o( the explosion is that both gas and coal dust were 
involved. the quantity of gas required would be considerably less tban this. 
How much less is a matter of speculation. 
THE SoURC" OF TB" GAS 
48. During its existence S's Unit must have been statutorily inspected 
by deputies at least 400 times and, in addition, examinations for firedamp 
would have been made on the very many occasions when shotfiring took 
place. There was, however. no record of firedamp ever having been found 
before the explosion. Indeed. tests for firedamp were made on S's Face 
within two hours before the explosion: a shotfirer. H. Walker, tested between 
11.0 and 11.30 a.m. just before he fired a shot to free tbe jib of lhe coal 
cutling machine: and during a pre·shift inspection Canbam made tests in 
the left corner of lhe face at about 12.30 p.m. Bonh men teslified that they 
found no sign of gas. 
49. Gas was obviously present at the left corner of S's Face when the 
explosion occurred at about 1.5 p.m., some 3S minutes after Canham 
had tested there and it was suggested at the Inquiry. not surprisingly, that 
something unusual happened during this time to produce the gas. This 
view is supported by consideration of the amount of methane generaUy 
produced in these worki ngs. 
SO. The seam was described as •. moderately gassy", producing some 
200 cubic feet of methane per ton of coal worked. but statutory samples 
of the return air from 5"s Unil laken on 29tb February and 28tb March 
had been shown by analysis not to contain firedamp. These were the only 
samples of the return ajr taken after 5's Unit had started, though samples 
should have been taken 'weekly during uhe first 30 days of its life. After 
the explosion H.M. Inspectors made ,tests in the machine undercut, the pack 
to the right of S's Intake. sholholes i n  coal and holes drilled into the floor 
to investigate the possibility of firedamp from those places having been 
involved in the explosion. Using a tube they were able to extract smaU 
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51. Determinations made in the general body of the air some days after 
the explosion. but when no coal was being worked, showed a methane 
content of 0·35 per cent. in 2,100 cubic feet of air per minute in 5's Return, 
which indicated a .. make" of about.7 cubic feet of mebhaDe per minute. 
Determinations made after 5's Face had been connected with 5's New 
Loader Gate. and when coal was stiiJ being worked on the 22 yard race 
of the latter. showed a make of only about 12 cubic feet of methane in 
6,000 cubic feet of air per minute. 
52. Tbe general make of firedamp was clearly small. It might have 
been increased somewhat by additional crushing of the coal; Ll-tat such 
crushing existed during the few days before (he explosion was �hOWD by 
the coal having been a little easier to work. by the jib of the coal cutting 
machine having become fast in .the undercut OD the morning of the explosion 
and by some indications of weighting on roof supports in the. Ribside. 
Nevertheless. I conclude that the general make of methane in the seam 
could not in half an hour or so have produced Ithe firedamp involved in the 
explosion, and that it was necessary to look for some other source. 
53. I conclude that methane did not come from the hard sandstone roof. 
The only other possible source was the underlying Low Haigh Moor Seam. 
There is room for argument. however. about the possible size. rate and place 
of the emission. An emission would be most likely to result from the 
formation of suitable channels in the fireclay separating the two $elms. In 
a post·explosion examination one of H.M. Inspectors, W. H. N. Carter. 
found a break in the floor along the Ribside and 1 consider that there 
were probably similar breaks 40 the inaccessible \'-'\3ste. In my view <these 
breaks were the result of the perimeter of S's Unit excavation being subjected 
to increased pressure from its overlying strata. This pressure developed 
because 1Jhe 1hick sandstone bed above Ithe seam supported �he load on 
the 40 yard wide excavation substantially without breakage and transmitted 
that load to the perimeter of the excavation. In these conditions the fireclay 
bed would tend to "heave" a little and thus fracture. I consider it 
likely that methane was emitted from these breaks in tbe waste and was 
carried by the leakage currents to the lower end of the Ribside where it 
could have taken part in the explosion. I am not greatly impressed by 
the suggestions made at the Inquiry that a fall in the waste expelled this 
gas on to the face in the vicinity of the coal cutting machine. J do not 
think it is necessary to postulate such a happening, for which there is DO 
evidence. In  my opinion the gas on the face came from the downthrow 
fault of 2 feet or so which had been exposed in the right hand corner. This 
fault was a line of inherent weakness which would predjspose the rormation 
of an open break along its plane by the forces T have described. Any 
emission of gas from the floor at this fault would be carried forward by 
the ventilation, some through the waste and some towards the point of 
ignition. In my view, all the emissions which occurred took the form of 
heavy seepages rather than a sudden outburst, since the weak ventilation 
current was able to dilute the total emission to a concentration not greatly 
above the lower limit of inflammability. 
54. Shortly after the explosion a heavy concentration of firedamp was 
found to have accumulated in the inbye half of 5's Intake Gate. that is to 
say towards the highest point in the Unit. This considerable volume of gas 
must have been released after the explosion. I consider that it also came 
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from noor breaks at the fault and elsewhere which would have been aggra­
vated by strata movement due to the displacement of supports. The 
.. bumps" heard after the explosion. and considered at the time to be further 
explosions. were in my view Daises caused by such strata movement. 
• 
TilE STANDARD OF VENTTLATlO"" 
55. The ventilation of IQ East District inbye the Loading Point had 
nothing to commend it. 
56. Air measurements made on 6th and 8th May by J. Carver. one ol 
H.M. InspC:ctors. showed that serious ventilation losses were occurring beyond 
the loading Point. Those made on 6th May were In conditions approxi­
mately closely to those prevailing at the time of the explosion. though it was 
impossible to reproduce those conditions. When the measurcments were 
made there was only a crawling road through the part of the ribside which 
had fallen but. bearing in mind the open waste and the gap in the pack, 
I conclude that the consequential restriction would have little effect on the 
quantity of air entering S's L1nit. Neither in my view would the restric­
tion have altercd materially the relative quantities of air passing through 
ribside and waste. 
57. A quantity of 12.165 cubic feel of air per minute was measured some 
300 yards outbye of the intake slit. but of this only 2.240 cubic feet per 
minute rcached a point on 5's intake 10 yards illbye the intake slit. At a 
point 10 yards back from 5's Face the quantity was further reduced to 
1,580 cubic feet per minute. This loss was shown by tests with chemical 
smoke clouds to be caused by air leaking through the left-hand roadside 
pack into the waste. On 5's Face. starting from the intake end. smoke 
tests showed that air was coursjng down the waste, but this leakage became 
less marked as the ribside pack was approached. In the waste immediately 
adjoining thi') pack the air was stagnant. On the face itself. the air velocity 
in the rC!o.tricted area over the coal cutting machine was �timated by smoke 
tests to be 22'5 feet per minute. In the left hand corner the air quantity 
was too small to be measured. Towards the outbye cnd of the Ribside 
there was the gap 9 yards long in the packing and through this gap a quantity 
of at Icast 825 cubic feet of air per minute was passing. The total quantity 
must have been grea'ter than this, since it was only possible 10 make ':l 
meaSllrement in respect of part of the opening in the pack. 
58. The further tests made on 8th May produced somewhat different 
re�ults bccau')e by then the gap in the pack had been filled in. Nevertheless. 
they conhrmed that losses of the same kind were still occurring and that 
the air current in the left hand corner of the face was so slow as to be 
.. indeterminatc ". 
59. These conditions were the result of widely distributed defects in 
planning and execution which in my view arose from a failure to appreciate 
fully some elementary, but fundamental. considerations. For instance. 
immediately outbye of 5's Unit in a distance of about 280 yards there was 
severe leakage from intake to return amounting to some 50 per cent. of 
the aIr. The existence of this leakage had been "'nown as early as March. 
1958. and its extent had been measured by the safcty olficer. K. Staples. 
in January. 1959. It was not surpnslI1g that this leakage existed. The 
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roadside packs of I's Unil had been built wilh rock ripped down from lhe 
hard. sandstone roof. AIt�ough this material was excellent from the point 
of view of roof support. It was much less so from tht: point of view of 
ventilation for there would have been very little small stone 10 serve to hll 
up the joints and to make the packs reasonably airtight. Moreover. the 
slrong roof of lhe old I 's Face (lhe 40-yard widlh of which had been sellled 
largely by surface support considerations) would be unlikelv to consolidate 
the packs or to fall in the waste. These conditions were 
"
bound to allow 
considerable leakage. Section 59 of lhe Mines and Quarries ACl, 1954, 
makes it unlawful to use roads as intake and return airway.) unless there 
have been taken such steps as are necessary to minimise the leakage of air 
between them. At the time of the explosion the relevant length of the two 
roads concerned lay within 450 feet of a working face and so was outside 
the scope of the section, though this had not always been the case. There 
is also room for argument as to what steps are " necessary " if the qllan� 
lily of air arriving at the end of a road is adequate for ventilation purposes. 
The management was in fact attempting to meet the situation by driving 
a new return airway (2's Drift) as quickly as possible. 
60. Notwithstanding this loss of air, the quantity reaching S's Intake Slit 
might stil.1 have been satisfactory for the ventilation of 5's Unit had there 
been no further loss. In point of fact, however. the layout was such as to 
encourage other leakages. The Intake Slit was low and narrow. and its 
cross sectional area at its smallest part was only about to square feet ; this 
small passage. 37 feet long, was bound to restrict the flow of air through 
it  to some extent and so cause more air to leak into the return at 2's Transfer 
Point. In my view the steps taken to minimise this leakage could hav!! 
been more effective. The means actually provided-�two brattice sheets­
must have allowed a considerable amount. Mc. Glover suggested that these 
particular sheets had been supported on carefully made wooden frames 
prepared by a joiner but though one witness agreed. others mentioned only 
a cross· bar with either one or two uprights. Whether such frames were used 
or not, it is well known that 'br8'ttice sheets 'all: their best are less effective than 
doors. Indeed, evidence was given of a rule, made in 1 947, by the North 
Eastern Division of the National Coal Board, which said : 
" Ventilation must be diverted or regulated by doors at least in 
duplicate. Brattice sheets must not be used as a means of diverting 
or regulating main air currents, but should only be used for hurdle sheets 
and for ventilating fast corners," 
6 1 .  Carver's measurements inbye of the Intake Slit illustrated (-urlber 
defects some of which were, not surprisingly, a reproduction of those found 
when I's Face, also 40 yards wide, was lbeing worked. But an additional 
source of leakage came into being on the Friday before 'the explosion when 
the backward extension of 5'5 Intake holed through into 5's Return, so 
providing another route by which more of the ventilation of 5's Unit could 
short·circuit. This connection was necessary for the ultimate development 
of the double unit longwall face, but the evidence does not in any degree 
convince me that it was at all necessary to have it made at that stage, When 
made, it was closed with brattice sheets. the weight of the evidence suggesting 
that two such sheets were provided. Whatever -their number. however, they 
could not have prevented serious leakage at that point to the detriment of 
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the quantlly of air reaching 5's Face. This leakage would have been increased 
by traffic through the sheets. For example, there was evidence that on the 
morning shift berore the explosion some 20 small tub·loads of stone were 
taken through the sheets and, since the empty tub had to pass through i n  the 
reverse direction. the number of disturbances due to this cause alone would 
be about 40. 
62. The leakage through the left pack of the I ntake Gate should bave 
been expected from previous experience, though not necessarily in degree. 
The gap in the Ribside pack would intensify this leakage and cause some 
of the air reaching the road head to short circuit round the pack into the 
waste. The gap in the Ribside pack had existed throughout the life of the 
face, and I was surprised to be told of two sets of statutory air measurements 
made on 28th February and 28th March. 1 959. which purported to show 
that the amount of air reaching the left hand corner corresponded almost 
exactly with the amount leaving the intake 'foadhead. 
63. The Area General Manager had personally conducted the negotia­
tions in which permission was obtained to work the coaJ in the 10 East 
District. and he directed the long term planning. He decided and recorded 
that the double unit longwall face co uld not and must not be worked until 
more air had been made available for it by, among other steps. the driving 
of the new return airway. He apparently favoured development of the 
double unit face by means of a 4O·yard face but left the short term planning 
of the ventIlation for the intermediate stage to the Group Manager and 
manager. The execution of that stage should not have presented any serious 
difficulties, and yet during i t  the explosion occurred. J have no doubt that 
the relative case with which the air composition required by law was being 
malOtalOed gave a false sense of security to senior and junior officials alike. 
Had the quantity o[ air passing on 5's Unit been doubled. for example. the 
unit would still have been receiving less than the 5 to 6,000 cubic feet of air 
per minute which had been provided earlier for " s  and 2's Faces. With a 
doubled quantity the concentration of methane might have been taken below 
5 per cent. the lower limit of inflammability. for the evidence satisfies me that 
the firedamp which exploded was a weak mixture, containing perhaps about 
7 per cent. of methane. As it was, the quantity of ventilation on 5's Unit 
did not provide what good practice would have regarded as a reasonable 
margin for contingencies. 
64. This accumulation of errors of judgment and of execution in relation 
to ventilation of the 10 East District might have been avoided bad the 
development plan recorded the means to be adopted for the ventilation of 5's 
Unit in the intermediate stage. l cannot do better than emphasise a recom· 
mendation recently made by a very expert committee : 
•• [there is] considerable advantage to be gained by includjng ventiJa· 
lion amongst the items covered by the general development plans for 
a colliery which 3re agreed and signed by the mine management and 
specialist engineers concerned i n  the Area and which cannot be altered 
subsequently in any major respect without the agreement of these 
signatories." 
Such plans should show details of the means of ventilation to be adopted for 
each stage of the development of new workings. 
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65. The committee to which I have referred was set up by the Coal lndus. 
try National Consultative Council to study the circumstances of recent 
colliery explosions. This committee is generally known as the Bryan Com­
mittee after its chairman, Sir Andrew Bryan. a former Chief Inspector of 
Mines, who was until recently a member of the National Coal Board. 
Its report, which had not been published at the time of the explosion. is of 
the first importance and should be studied by all colliery managers and 
officials. 
Air Measllremellls and Firedamp Defermillafiolls 
66. The statutory ventilation samples i n  5's Unit. though taken during 
lhe Friday night shift. were in fact taken in the early hours of Saturday 
morning. I n  practice this might well have been the right time to take 
them. but it was nevertheless contrary to the strict wording of Regulation 
7 (5) of the Coal and Other Mines (Ventilation) Regulations, 1956', which 
prohibits the taking of samples on Saturdays. A further difficulty with this 
provision is that sampling may be impossible at. in the words of the Regu­
lations. " the appropriate stage of the operations " on the last shift of a 
week if. due to some mischance. what is considered the " appropriate 
stage "--coal cutting. for example-does not in fact take place. Clearly. 
Regulation 7 (5) should be amended. 
Firedamp Delectors 
67. There was no firedamp detector near the coal cutting machine at the 
time of the explosion. Furthermore. Coe's flame lamp was found in 5's 
Intake and was thus not under observation ; had it been at the machine it 
might easily have been seen to indicate the presence of gas in time to 
avert the consequences. In the pit as a whole, some 104 flame lamps were 
-issued daily and more were available in the stores. Mr. Machen crit.icised 
the management for not doing enough in relation (0 Regulation It of 
tbe Ventilation Regulations to induce men to learn to use flame lamps 
-3S firedamp detectors and afterwards to carry and use them as such. On 
the other hand, there was evidence that the workmen considered these 
'flame lamps to be unsuitable and would not readily undertake to carry 
them. It was rightly said that this was a national problem. and I do not 
th.ink I can do better than to commend once again a recommendation of 
the Bryan Committee : 
.. We are perturbed by the number of incidents in which firedamp 
detectors have not been used or even carried by the workmen in the 
requisite numbers as required by the Ventilation Regulations. A new 
and powerful campaign at colliery level should be initiated through the 
'Consultative machinery and in conjunction with the local union officials 
to obtain the co-operation of the workmen in carrying out in full the 
requirements of the Regulations. We consider that the effectiveness of 
providing these firedamp detectors can be appreciably improved either 
by the issue of relighter lamps on a more liberal scale or else by ensur­
ing a sufficiency of underground relighting stations_ This would 
eliminate the risk that lamps once extinguished remain unlighted 
throughout the shift or alternatively the necessity of taking in spare 
lamps or sending lamps to bank for relighting." 
• S.I. 1956. No. 1764. 
1 5  
PRECAUTIONS AGAINST CoAL DUST 
68. The Top Haigh Moor Seam contained 35'9 per cent. of volatile 
maner and accord ingly the Coal and Other Mines (precautions against 
Inflammable Dust) Regulations, 1956·, required roadway dust to contain 
a minimum of 75 per cent. of incombustible matter. 
69. Appendix 3 gives the results of the analyses of dust samples collected 
in the 1 0  East District between May, 1958, and April. 1 959. I t  shows that 
though the last interval between samples was five days more than the 30 
allowed by law. the road had in fact been sampled 1 2  times in just over 
1 1  months ; the last set of samples had heen collected 1 4  days before the 
explosion. Six samples had been collected on each sampling occasion on 
1 0  East Main Haulage and Trunk Conveyor Roads ; two more would have 
been necessary to reach the rate of 1 0  samples per mile required by law. 
It will be seen that only one sample of the 72 collected contained less thao 
75 per cent. of incombustible matter. 
70. Two samples had been collected in 5's Return Gate on 8th April, 
although this road had a length less than the 1 50 feet at which sampling 
becomes obligatory. The roof and sides sample was found to contain 79·2 
per cent. of incombustible matter but the floor sample only 66·3 per cenL 
h is, however. important to bear in mind that Ihe explosion died out in this 
road for lack of fuel. Two samples had also been collected in 5's Intake 
Gate on 8th April. When, after the explosion, the results of analyses were 
received it became known thal the roof and sides sample contained 93·9 
per cent. and the floor sample 8 1 ' 2  per cent. of incombustible matter. 
7 1 .  Twenty-three dust samples were collected in the regulation manner 
by R. Lawrence, one of H.M. Inspectors, on 27th and 29th April. The results 
of the analyses of these samples are given in Appendix 3 : they cannot. of 
course, be directly related to pre-explosion conditions but the general picture 
is that the incombustible dust content was substantially lower than that 
shown by the samples collected before the explosion. 
72. There was evidence that the coal conveyors in the affected area had 
not been well maintained. On 10 East trunk conveyor there was found after 
the explosion spillage so excessive as to prevent a large number of rollers 
from turning. Pre-explosion conditions would not have been much different. 
as the evidence indicated that there was little coal on the conveyors when 
the explosion occurred. 1t  must. however. be borne in mind that this con· 
veyor also carried stone from 2's Drift so that some of the spillage might 
have been stone. 
73. The bottom belt conveyors on the Return and on the Ribside were 
not supported anywhere on rollers : the bottom belts ran on the floor. They 
had run in the same track for a considerable time during which the grinding 
effect of the bottom belt on coal spillage must have produced a great deal 
of fine dust and from that point of view the equipment was unsuitable. 
74. With any type of conveyor it is difficult to maintain a coal transport 
road in a state that will guarantee immunHy at all ,times from the coal dust 
explosion hazard. For this reason it is regarded as sound practice. both here 
and in some countries abroad, to provide stone dust barriers as a second 
• S.I. 1956. No. 1 769. 
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line of defence. A National Coal Board instruction on the subject of dust 
barriers, dated 1st September, 1953, was read out at the Inquiry. The 
purpose of this instruction was to make the provision of dust barriers 
obligatory in mines owned by the Board. On my reading. this document 
required the provision of at least one barrier outside 5's Un.it. In fact there 
were no barriers in the district and it is thus extremely fortunate that the 
explosion flame was confined to the area of 5's Unit. 
75. Stone dust barriers are to some extent in the development stage and 
imponanl experimental work on them is still being conducted. In my opinion, 
however, sufficient is known already to justify their provision being made a 
legal requirement. 
76. These considerations are in my view much more important than the 
arguments at the Inqui.ry as to whether 5's Ribside was a face or a road for 
the purpose of the regulations. I consider i t  unnecessary to attempt to settle 
this legal argument ; as a mining engineer I regard such a place as a standing 
face but nevertheless, in tbe circumstances which obtained, a place even 
more dangerous than a conveyor roadway from the coal dust explosion point 
of view. 
77. Airborne dust endangers health as well as increasing the potential 
explosion risk. Dust suppression measures were not being taken in the 
working of coal, though there was a water spray at 2's Transfer Point. I 
regard their absence as regrettable even though sampling by thermal 
precipitator indicated that dust conditions were well below the limit currently 
regarded as satisfactory. In my view dry cutting should nowadays be 
avoided as a matter of course. Wet cutting would have had the additional 
advantage of reducing the likelihood of incendive sparks from pyritic 
intrusions in the cutting horizon. 
ELECTRICAL MATTERS 
Notice 0/ Intention to introduce Electricity 
78. The last occasion on which, in pursuance of regulation 2 of the Coal 
and Other Mines (Electricity) Regulations. 1956*, the management gave 
notice of intention to introduce electricity into workings in the Haigh Moor 
Seam was in 1 954. That notice related to the use of electricity on the South 
West Haulage Road and no specific notice was subsequently given in respect 
of its extension into I's, 2'5 or 5's Units. This may well have been an 
oversight, and it is only fair Ito say tbat it seems unlikely that any objection 
would have been made to the introduction of electricity into J's or 2's Units. 
It might, however, have been otherwise in the caSe of 5's Unit because of 
the obvious weakness of tbe ventilating arrangements. 
79. Before 1957 notice of intention to introduce electricity underground 
was required in respect of " any ventilating district " but the comparable 
provision in Regulation 2 of the present regulations relates to its introduction 
into " any part of a mine ". Neither expression is free from ambiguity, and 
i t  is difficult to say exactly when notice is required Iby the law as it  stands. 
In my opinion it would not be possible to devjse a regulation defining 
• S.1. 1 956, No. 1760. 
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precisely the circumstances in which notice should be given. but it  is never­
theless important that H.M. Inspectors should know when any substantial 
extension is to be made in rthe use of electricity at a mine. What is 
.. substantial " depends on locaJ circumstances, and I was glad ,to learn at 
the Inquiry that in this Division a sensible arrangement had been made 
before the explosion for individual managements to settle with the Divisional 
Inspector procedure that would allow the intentions of rthe present require­
ments to be complied with. T recommend that this procedure should be 
adopted elsewhere. 
Trailing Cables 
80. The trailing cable was of the type known as .• type 1 4  of British 
Standard 708 ", widely used in British mines. in which each power conductor 
has a protective earthed screen. Earthed screens and associated earth­
leakage protection devices-in this case the core balance type-offer pro­
tection against the risk of electric shock. but not necessarily against the 
ignition of firedamp by an arc should an electrical fault develop as the 
result, for example, of physical damage to the cable. 
8 1 .  The provision of this latter protection is a long standing problem 
of great difficulty. However rapidly a protective device operates there 
will still be a time lag in the pbysical opening of the circuit breaker and 
in that time incendive sparking or arcing may occur. It may be possible 
to reduce the danger by employing a protective system in which earth 
fault currents are restricted. At least one system employing this principle 
is already in use in this country. Suoh systems are unlikely to give com­
plete protection, but when associated with individually screened cables 
they may reduce earth fault currents 10 a value at which destructive arcing. 
and consequent emergence of an arc outside the cable. is unlikely 10 occur. 
Another approach, already engaging the attention of researcb workers. 
lies in the development of reliable firedamp monitoring equipment. Such 
equipment could be incorporated in the face machinery and arranged to 
cut ofT the power supply at the gate end switch in the event of the detection 
of a firedamp content greater than some pre-determined level. 
82. Further study is certainly required. and I recommend that discussions 
should begin as soon as possible hetween electrical engineers of the Ministry 
of Power and of the National Ooal Board with a view to a further attack 
on the problem. 
MANA.GEMENT OF THE COLLIERY 
General 
83. Evidence was given on matters (including alleged contraventions of 
the law) designed to illustrate the general standard of management a t  the 
colliery. A number of these matters do not appear to me to have sufficient 
bearing on the circumstances of the explOSIon to justify my dealing with 
them in this report. 
Changes ill Staff 
84. Mr. G. S. Senior. who was manager at the time of the explosion, 
,bears general statutory responsibiJity for the many unsatisfactory features 
which existed in the workings of 10 East District, but I sympathise with him 
to some extent in the position in whioh he found himself. He had taken 
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charge of this large mine about I I  weeks before the explosion in tbe 
temporary absence of the regular manager. It would naturally take him 
some time to get a firm grip of his new responsibilities and in tbat time he 
would depend more than is normal on his under· managers and other officials. 
At the time of his appointment. the 40-yard face of 5's Unit was just about 
to start and at that time he would not have been acting unreasonably in 
treating the general ventilation conditions in 10 East District as satisfactory 
since the ventilation records did not show any significant quantities of 
firedamp. 
8S. The ventilation difficulties in 5's must have become more pro· 
Dounced as the Unit developed and this should have been appreciated by 
the under·officials directJy responsible for 5's. Unfortunately, there was 
another change of management staff just after the 40-yard face began ; 
the under·manager, A. S. Harris. who had seen the starting o[ the Unit, 
was transferred to another mine on 2 1 st February, three weeks after the 
manager had been changed. Harris had clearly been concerned about air 
leakage when gas was found near a fault in 2's and he asked Staples to 
make the measurements in 10 East District. In respect of S's development. 
Harris said in effect that he expected some leakage between the intake and 
return as S's face advanced. but thought that this could be tolerated as he 
had about 5.000 cubic feel of air per minute al the Intake Slit. He would. 
presumably, not know that another connection would be made between 
S's Intake Gate and the Return before the proposed connection with the 
New Loader Gate. nor have foreseen that a gap would be left in the 
Ribside pack as this omission apparently occurred just about the time 
he was succeeded by Gregg. Virtually simultaneous changes of manager 
and under.manager may sometimes be inevitable but are generally very 
undesirable from the safety point of view. 
Deputies' Duties 
86. Plenty of deputies were employed in 10 East. mort! than enough to 
carry out the basic statutory duties, but they were neither well organised 
nor well controlled. Thus. the manager did not satisfy me that he had 
discharged effectively his duty to assign to the deputies their respective 
districts and to fix meeting stations with the required identification marks. 
As the result of this omission some deputies regarded the pit bottom as their 
meeting station, while others thought that their district began at the entrance 
to 10 East Main Haulage Road. 
87. Certain deputies. and some at least of their superior officials, lacked 
Cl proper appreciation of their statutory responsibiJities. There were failures 
to carry out the statutory requirements in relation to inspections and reports. 
An afternoon shift deputy, for example. commenced his pre·shift inspection 
four hours before the night shift was due to enter the district instead of the 
statutory two hours. In other cases, statutory reports were written by 
deputies olhe[ than tbe one who had made the inspection. These disclosures 
were very disturbing. In particular. the irregularities in inspection times 
cannot be regarded as technicalities. It is possible for conditions in a 
district to vary quite suddenly and unexpectedly and the whole purpose 
of a pre�shi(t inspection is to make as certain as possible tbat a district is 
safe for men to enter : the statutory interval of two hours allows reasonable 
time for a deputy to inspect his district and brings the inspection reasonably 
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close 10 the lime of entry of the following shift ; to double the interval 
quile arbitrarily was an irresponsible action. 
88. In this mall!!r the superior officials. lO say the least, were far from 
"left. The lime worked by the afternoon shift deputy was such that had 
the pre-shift inspection in fact been made at the times entered in the statutory 
n.-port books. he would have had to work ovenime unless some other deputy 
had been sent to do it. The overmen concerned would be bound to know 
that the deputy was not working overtime and I find it difficult to believe 
Ihal they did nOI know what was going on, even though one of them 
admitted that he did not examine the statutory reports made by the deputy 
in question. 
89. The manager did nOl see the originals of reports made by deputies. 
but he regularly saw the daily summaries of them which the law allows as 
an alternati\e. and these summaries were also seen occasionally by the 
under-manager. The summaries showed the times entered by deputies for 
their pre-shift inspections, and it should have been seen quite readily mat 
those limes were nOl consistent with the working hours of the deputies 
concerned. A point of general importance arises here. Before the Mines 
and Quarries Act. 1 954, came into force an under-manager had to read 
and countersign the deputies' reports daily, but he has now no obligations 
corresponding to those imposed on the manager by section 10 of that Act. 
This omission should be remedied. 
90. The system of presenting statutory reports to the manager in the 
form of summary sheets is a sound one but it  is essential for the person 
preparing them to understand what sort of matters ought to be specially 
noted. The discrepancies between shift and inspection times to which ] have 
referred were not in fact brought to the manager's attention. If the person 
\\ ha is to prepare summaries has not the experience which will allow him 
te recognise unusual matters. he should be given careful instructions on 
how to perform his duties. 
SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS 
9 1 .  J summarise my conclusions as follows : -
l .  The accident was a n  explosion of firedamp. initiated a t  the left 
hand corner of 5's Face by an electric arc from the damaged trailing 
cable of a coal cutting machine. The explosion was propagated to 
some extent by coal dust. (paragraphs 38 and 46.) 
2. The firedamp involved emanated from the Low Hnigh Moor Seam 
some 7 feet below and was emitled fairly rapidly. thougb not suddenly. 
rrom floor breaks mainly at a raulL (Paragraph 53.) 
3. The ventilation or 5's Unit did not, by standards of good practice, 
allow a sufficient margin of safety. As the result of defects in short term 
planning and in execuLion, there were air leakages so great that the 
velocity of the air at the left hand conner of the face was not sufficient 
to deal with any substantial increase in the usual make of firedamp. 
(Paragraph 63.) 
4. In respect of both choice and maintenance of equipment, insufficient 
attention was given to precautions against coal dust in 5's Unit. 
( Paragraphs 72-77.) 
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SUMMARY OF RECOMMENDATIONS 
92. In summary. my recommendations are as follows : 
Ventilation 
l .  The appropriate development plan for a colliery should show 
particulars of ventilation, including the means to be adopted for 
ventilating new workings at each stage of their development. (Para­
graph 64.) 
2. At all levels in the industry there should be energetic efforts to 
overcome the difficulties which are resulting in workmen being reluc­
tant to carry and use firedamp detectors. (Paragraph 67.) 
3.  Regulation 7 (5) of the Coal and Other Mines (Ventilation) Regu­
lations. 1 956. is technically defective and should be amended. (Para­
graph 66.) 
Precall1ions against Coal Dust 
4. It should be made obligatory to provide stone dust barriers on 
coal conveyor roads underground. (paragraph 75.) 
5. Coal cut by machine should be cut .. wet n. (Paragraph 77.) 
Electricity 
6. A further attempt should be made to devise an electrical protec­
tive system tbat will be capable of eliminating, or at least substan­
tially reducing. the dangers of incendive arcing from a damaged trail­
ing cable. (Paragraph 82.) 
7. Local arrangements should be made between individual manage· 
ments and H.M. Inspectors to ensure that notice of intention to intro­
duce electricity is given at appropriate stages in the development of 
an electrical installation. (Paragraph 79.) 
Statutory Reports 
8. Under-managers should be given legal responsibilities similar to 
those imposed on the manager by section 10 of the Mines and Quarries 
Act, 1954. (Paragraph 89.) 
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APPENDIX I 
Names or the mt!n killed and injured In the explosion 
NlIml' Age Occupation 
Killed 
Lawrence Coe. 38 Overman 
Wilham Hudson 46 Machine man 
Jack Rothery 54 Belt maintenance man 
Charles Ray 53 Belt maintenance man 
Wilfred Wardte 38 Machine man 
Injured 






Results of analyses of road dust samples collected in 10 East District 
Ex/racfs /rom M. & Q. Form 207 
Percentage of incombustible matter in samples taken on 
Place of sampling 
2.5.58 6.6.58 2.7.58 18.8.58 10.9.58 14.10.58 24.10.58 28.11.58 29.12.58 1 28.1.59 1 4.3.59 1 8.4.59 
10 EosI Main Hot1/age Road 
Zone: 
AZ I Roof and Sides 
Floor . . .  
AZ 2 Roof and Sides 
Floor ...  
AZ 3 Roof and Sid;; 
Floor . . .  
AZ 4 Roof and Sid� 
Floor . . .  
AZ 5 Roof and Sid� 
Floor . . .  
AZ 6 Roof and Sides 
Floor . .  
10 East Relum 
Zone: 
AM 1 Roof and Sides 
Floor . . .  
A M 2 Roof and Sides 
Floor . .  
10 East 5's Return 
Zone : 
AS I Floor .. , 
AS 2 Roof and Sid� 
10 East 5's Intake 
Zone: 
AT 1 Floar... . . .  



















: : I 
-- - --- --- --- ---
95 · 2  97 · 5  99·6 96·2 95 · 6  
88·4 82·0 89·4 79·0 
97·2 97·4 95 · 2  88 · 5  
86·3 8 1 · 7  86·4 8 5 - 1  85 · 8  
98·4 94·8 94·7 90·4 94·4 
89·6 84 · 5  93'8 83·9 
98·0 92·0 95 · 6  9 1 · 3  
8 1 · 6  80·4 92'3 88·0 87 · 1  
98 · 1  95·5 98 · 1  93 · 5  97·7 
92-0 78·3 92·2 90·6 
96·6 98·2 98·2 97·3 
8 1 · 7  8 1 · 0  89·2 86·3 8 5 · 3  
94 0 1 - 1 98 0 1 - 1 96 2 �lL�� - 9 1 · 0  - 85·4 9 1  4 - 77 8 -- 97 · 1  - 97·8 99 6 - 93 9 -75·4 - 85·9 - 90 6 - 91 4 - 89 6 
• This was rcsamplcd on 17.6.S8 and the incombustible matter was then found 10 be 92·9 per cent. 
t This was not resamplcd because of the occurrence of the explosion. 
92·7 
99 · 5  
9 1 · 4  
98 · 6  






8 1 · 2  








Results of analyses of dust samples taken by H.M. lnspectors 
in 10 East District, on 27th and 29th April 
10 East Trunk Conveyor Road 







5's '''lake Gale 
Distance from face (yards) 
0- 50 . . .  
50-100 
5's Return Gale . 
10 Eas! Retum 
Distance outbye 2'5 Return (yards) 
0- 50 
50-100 
5's New Loader Gate 
Incombustible Maner (per cent.) 
Floor Roof Sides 
47 ·2 48 ' 7  
5 ) , 0  43 · 9  
5 5 ' 5  8 1 · 9  
59 · 5  73 · 7  87 '5 
7 5 · 5  7 ) ' 5  
60 · 6  44 · 8  
76' 1 6) , 6  
44·0 57 · 1  
67 ·7 65 · 7  
84 · 1  5 9 · )  
48 · 8  67 · 0  
NOTE : No samples were taken in 5's Ribside. which was not accessible. 
(l2460) Wt. 692-I511 K31 10/'9 D.L. 
\ 
Printed and published by 
HER MAJESTY'S STATIONERY OPPIC8 
To be pun:hascd from 
York House, Kingsway, London w.c.2 
4n CW"ord Street, London w.l 
IlA Castle Street. &linburgb 2 
J09 St. Mary Street. Cardiff 
39 King _. Manchester 2 
Tower Lane, Bristol I 
2 EdmUDd Street, Binningham 3 
80 Cbi_ Street. Belfast 
or throuIh llDy bookseUe:r 
Priltred in GretJI Britailr 
